






# Operation Together Forward, Surge Operations Main Effort - Adamiyah/Shaab/Ur (Operation Arrowhead Strike 6, 17 FEB 07)

SECRET // REL TO USA-MCP// 20170212







# Operation Together Forward, Surge Operations Supporting Effort - Baghdad (Operation Arrowhead Strike 6, 17 FEB 07)



Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,  
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff  
Declassified on: 201505

SECRET//REL TO USA MCF//20170212




(Operation Arrowhead Strike 6, 17 FEB 07)

Eagle Venture II: (17FEB07) 210Mtn  
Attacks to disrupt IOT deny AIF FOI  
during establishment of a new IABP

Op Shingle: (12-17FEB07) 4/25ID  
Emplace 4x SKT IOT destroy IED  
emplacers on MSR Tampa and in  
AIF during Chaka raid IED

~~SECRET//REL TO USA MCFM 204702+2~~





# MND-B Update

*Provide MNF-I Commander with current information on:*

- *Setting Conditions for Phase III Operations*
- *Baghdad City Command and Control*
- *Arbe'een Security*

The overall classification of this briefing is ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ACGU~~

~~Approved by: 1CD G2~~

~~Classified by: Multiple Sources~~

~~Reason: EO 12958 (as amended) 1.4(a), (c) and (d)~~

~~Declassify on: 20170210~~

As of: 10 February 2007

ACTO:  (b)(3), (b)(6)

VOIP  (b)(6)

# Setting Conditions for Phase III Operations

**Problem:** Transitioning Security and Governance Responsibilities to Multiple Iraqi Entities

**Discussion:** Transitioning responsibility to Iraqi Security and Civil agencies will be complicated by the fact that functional district boundaries are misaligned. For instance, Iraqi Police Service boundaries are not aligned with the nine security districts. Other discrepancies include Beladiyahs and rural governance districts (Qadas and Nahias) not aligning with the Baghdad Operational Command or Coalition Force boundaries. This presents a challenge for MND-B and subordinate brigades who will be forced to transition security, essential service and governance responsibilities/projects to multiple agencies. In a given area, coalition forces may have to transition SWETF projects to the local NAC, security oversight to a Security District Brigade commander headquartered in a region governed by a different NAC, and finally, transition police/law and order operations to a police district headquartered at a third location. The ideal transition condition is one where security and governance responsibilities are partnered at every level from the local to provincial. In this partnership alignment, a Security District Brigade commander is responsible for security within a specific region, governed by a single governance body, with a single police commander responsible for law and order.

**Way Ahead:** Work with our Iraqi partners to align and partner security, governance and police responsibilities at every level. Since police districts are closely aligned with current governance districts, the logical start point may be to expand or alter Security Districts to match police districts in Phase III.




# Recommended Security / Civil Alignments

Province	Security	Law and Order	Governance	Coalition Forces
	BOC Commander	Provincial Police Chief	Provincial Governor	MNC-I Commander
	Area Division Commander	Directorate Police Chief	Provincial Council	MND-B Commander BCT Commander (s)
District / Beladiyah	Security District Brigade Commander	District Police Chief (s)	District Chairman And Council Qada Council	BN Commander
Hayy	Security District Battalion Commander(s)	Station Police Chief (s)	Neighborhood Chairman And Council(s) Nahia Council	

- Align terrain / boundaries with leaders that have the responsibility and authority within those districts


## IP Districts - SD Mismatches





~~S. T/REL USA, MCFI/20170215~~


## Beladiyahs – SD Mismatches



~~SECRET//REL USA, MCFI/20170215~~



MND-B AO - BOC AO with SD





[illegible]

~~SECRET//REL USA. NOFORN 75045~~



# Baghdad City Command and Control

**Problem:** Soldiers do not understand the Command and Control relationship between Coalition Forces (CF) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) within the Baghdad Operational Command (BOC) and the relationship does not allow for effective unity of command and a synchronized effort within Baghdad City.

**Discussion:** Effective 1 March 2007, the Command and Control relationship between the ISF and CF within the MND-B AOR is changed from all ISF units TACON to MND-B to all ISF units attached to the BOC. This increases the challenges associated with conducting joint operations by adding additional layers of command and formal barriers between CF and ISF units operating within the Security Districts. Further, the Iraqi command and control system is hampered by the cultural requirement for direct orders from the top in order to conduct operations at the bottom, regardless of the situation. This command and control relationship increases the coordination requirements prior to conducting operations and results in a less flexible system of command and control.

**Way Ahead:** Continue to focus on the partnership relationship between CF and ISF formations in order to mitigate the impact of the formal command and control structure. Establish a robust LNO cell embedded within the BOC in order to integrate the operations of CF and ISF forces throughout Baghdad City. Rejoin the Sadr City DAC in advance of establishing JSSs within Sadr City and continue to establish JSSs throughout Baghdad City in order to coordinate joint operations down to the lowest levels. Foster partnership between the BOC Commander and the MND-B Commander while simultaneously maintaining the relationship developed between the Karkh and Rusafa Commands and the MND-B DCG(M).





# Definitions



**Coordination:** The action necessary to ensure adequately integrated relationships between separate organizations located in the same area. Coordination may include such matters as fire support, emergency defense measures, area intelligence, and other situations in which coordination is considered necessary (FM 6-0)

**Partnership: Purpose.** The purpose of Partnership is to assist each Iraqi commander by using a coach, teach and advise approach to develop his subordinate ISF leadership and staffs. This is distinct from, but coordinated with the activities of Transition Teams. Coalition leaders and their units at all levels advise and assist their affiliated Iraqi partners. Partner units provide staff expertise to Iraqi units, planning and evaluation assistance to facilitate training. Transition teams are the primary tool that incorporates and provides the training directly to Iraqi formations. Lastly, Iraqi Commanders with their Coalition Partner Commander jointly assess the current state of their Iraqi units.

- Sharaka wa Tafahum, translated as Partnership and Understanding. Defined as the strategic relationship between MNF-I, the Iraqi authorities, and the US and Coalition Missions.
- Ilitizan Mushtarak, translates as United Commitment at the operational and unit level. This term describes a type of habitual relationship which includes a degree of obligation between brothers or members of the same tribe. This builds upon unit cohesion and a buddy system created within units with good esprit de corps.



# Overwatch Definitions

**Tactical Overwatch:** Coalition Forces provide overwatch at the tactical level during Iraqi Army Lead. Coalition Forces will posture tactical-level reaction forces in close proximity and within quick response times for Iraqi Army units that own battlespace. The purpose of these forces is to: (1) prevent the defeat of IA and police units, (2) reestablish local security control in situations that exceed Iraqi Army and Police capability and (3) provide emergency support to transition teams. Coalition Forces continue partnership to provide enablers for support and sustainment for Iraqi Army until those units reach operational independence. Authority to intervene in tactical overwatch during IAL is held at MND level.


**Operational Overwatch:** Coalition Forces provide overwatch at the operational level for mature Iraqi Army units capable of independent operations in stable areas under IAL and for provinces at PIC. During operational overwatch, Coalition Forces will maintain forces capable of providing area coverage, with relatively longer response times, for areas under PIC and mature IAL. The purpose of these forces is to intervene in situations that exceed ISF capability and endanger civil authority security control at the provincial level. The authority to intervene with operational overwatch forces is held at MNC-I for mature IAL areas and at MNF-I (with GOI coordination) for areas under PIC.





# Baghdad Security District Command and Control

08 - 28 FEB 2007






# Baghdad Security District Command and Control

## BOC Assumes TACON

as of BOC FOC @ 01 March 2007







# Arba'een Security



**Problem:** Incorporating lessons learned from Ashura security operations, how do we modify our concept of support to the GOI for the Arba'een observance.

**Discussion:** While Ashura security can be considered an overall success, a catastrophic attack was narrowly averted a day prior to the holiday. The deployment of a Stryker Bn (-) to the Karbala area in response to the PJCC attack a week earlier gave us the combat power to fix and destroy many of the Shia extremists who planned to kill Ashura worshippers while causing the rest to surrender en masse. As written, our Arba'een plan does not include a similar deployment of Stryker combat vehicles to the Karbala or Najaf region.

The ISF will re-direct a considerable amount of combat power from the Baghdad Security Plan during the Arba'een period to protect the worshippers in Karbala and Najaf, as well as the Kadhamiya Shrine in Baghdad. Additionally, because there are no clearing operations planned for the Arba'een period in Baghdad we assume little risk in re-directing assets to the south.




**Way Ahead:** Approve the deployment of a Stryker Bn to 4/25's battlespace to assist in securing Arba'een worshippers.



# Arba'een Overview

- Predominately a Shia celebration; commemoration of the battle of Karbala and the martyrdom of Hussein, the third Imam, (Grandson of Muhammad) in 680
- Arba'een marks the end of the 40-day mourning period
- Commemoration includes:
  - processional from An Najaf to Karbala (on foot – 50 miles)
  - increased attendance at Shia mosques
  - "passion play" in the form of reenactments, chest beating and self flagellation

Although there is no current, credible reporting indicating terrorist attacks planned for the upcoming Shia observance of Arba'een, a successful large scale attack would have significant IO value given the increased media focus on Iraq. AQL and Sunni AIF may attempt to target Arba'een observances in order to discredit current MND-B operations.








# ARBA'EEN TIMELINE

(read Right to Left)




كانون الثاني  
MARCH

كانون الثاني  
FEBRUARY

Arba'een Security Window

ISF Diverted from BSP for Ashura




CF Diverted from BSP for Karbala /Ashura





# Operational Timeline








1. Op Burma (Arbaeen) Ph. IV  
disruption targets
  - a. Op Tundra Sweep\* re-attack
  - b. Op Permafrost re-attack
  - c. Hak (ivo Jabella)
  - d. E. Muella
2. Chaka III
3. Upper Buhayrat
4. Hussiniyah Mosque Set IVO Iskan
5. Karbala Target Set
6. ERW sites

**\* All operation names refer to deliberate targeting of AIF personnel or cells in the area illustrated on the map.**





- o Giant reeds along road provide concealment for insurgent IEDs
- o Also limit visibility and fields of fire around 2-10 MTN rural patrol bases
- o Burning and cutting reeds affords a temporary solution.
- o A chemical-based route maintenance TTP must be implemented to permanently control the reeds.

1) Mechanical destruction of the giant reed (mowing / mechanical / hand-cutting followed by burning or manual removal) followed by recurring herbicide treatments on an as needed basis to control reeds to prevent regrowth.

- 2) Spray mature reeds with chemical herbicide followed by burning or mechanically removal after the plant withers and dry.

### Environmental Concerns:

- o Rodeo is the preferred herbicide because it is EPA approved for use around aquatic areas, and is non-toxic to humans, animals, fish, and birds.
- o The chemicals biodegrade quickly in the soil and do not cause permanent environmental damage.
- o Proper application essential to prevent damage to surrounding crops.

Right-of-spraying equipment can be constructed by Minnesota Warner Company for approximately \$11,500 per system.

- Construction is based on our specifications, and Company needs 6-8 weeks to assemble and ship.
- Herbicides and surfactant is readily available through DLA Emergency Supply Operations Center.

**Legal Considerations:** Executive Order 11850, dtd 1975. TTP needs complete legal review and approval.



## Herbicide TTP for Rural Routes and Perimeter Security in 2-10 MTN AC

**Situation:** Giant reeds growing along roadsides provide excellent concealment for insurgents to emplace and detonate IEDs along rural routes within the 2-10 AO, which has resulted in numerous IED strikes. The reeds also limit visibility and fields of fire around rural patrol bases.

*Phragmites* sp. is a large and extremely invasive reed that commonly grows along roadsides, canals, and ditch banks. Stands reach up to 12-14ft in height and have become very dense (up to 30ft from roads). They reproduce from underground rhizomes that may extend 2 meters deep and have a large seed bank, so control is extremely difficult. Burning and cutting reeds affords a temporary solution. Reeds will continue to grow throughout the active growing season (Mar-Sep) and are very difficult to burn during this season due to high water content. A chemical-based route maintenance TTP must be implemented to permanently control the reeds.

**TTP Concept:** Used for two scenarios: 1) Mechanical destruction of the giant reed (mowing/mechanical/hand-cutting followed by burning or manual removal) followed by recurring herbicide treatments on an as needed basis to control reeds to prevent re-growth. 2) Spray mature reeds with chemical herbicide followed by burning or mechanically removal after the plant withers and dries.

Use industrial grade right-of-way spraying system with 500gal storage capacity. Mount to LMTV bed and disperse along routes or around base perimeter. Sprayers remotely controlled from inside vehicle to afford maximum protection to soldiers. Maximum MPH for best application is 10-15 MPH.

**Environmental Concerns:** The only approved herbicides for this TTP include *Rodeo* or *Roundup*. *Rodeo* is preferred since it is EPA approved for use around aquatic areas. Both are non-persistent, non-selective chemical herbicides and virtually non-toxic to humans, animals, fish, and birds. These herbicides are not classified as human or animal carcinogens. The chemicals biodegrade quickly in the soil and do not cause permanent environmental damage. Herbicides will damage or kill any plant that it contacts, so proper application is essential to prevent collateral damage to surrounding crops.

**Equipment:** Right-of-spraying equipment can be constructed by Minnesota Warner Company for approximately \$11,500 per system. Spraying systems are constructed based on our specifications and not a standard factory item. Company needs 6-8 weeks to assemble and ship.

Herbicides and surfactant is readily available through DLA Emergency Supply Operations Center. Inventory is adequate and NSNs available.

Legal Considerations: Executive Order 11850, dtd 1975. TTP needs complete legal review and approval.





# MND-B Challenges

*Provide MNF-I Commander with current information on:*

- *Setting Conditions for Phase III Operations*
- *Baghdad City Command and Control*
- *Arba'een Security*

The overall classification of this briefing is ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ACGU~~

~~Approved by: 1CD G2~~

~~Classified by: Multiple Sources~~

~~Reason: EO 12958 (as amended) - 1.4(a), (c) and (d)~~

~~Declassify on: 20170210~~

As of: 15 February 2007

ACTO:  (b)(3), (b)(6)

VOIP

(b)(6)



# Setting Conditions for Phase III Operations

**Problem:** Transitioning Security & Governance to Multiple Iraqi Entities

**Discussion:**

- Functional district boundaries are misaligned in Baghdad.
  - IPS boundaries not aligned with the 9 x SDs
  - Beladiyahs & rural governance districts (Qadas and Nahias) not aligned with BOC or CF boundaries.
- Challenge for MND-B & BCTs who must transition security, essential service and governance responsibilities / projects to multiple agencies.
- Example – for a given battle space, a CF BCT will transition:
  - SWETF projects to the local NAC
  - Security oversight to a SD Bde Cdr with HQs in a region governed by a different NAC, and
  - Police / law and order to a police district with HQs at a third location.
- Ideal transition = one where security and governance responsibilities are partnered at every level from the local to provincial.

**Way Ahead:**

- Work with Iraqi partners to align and partner security, governance and police responsibilities at every level.
- Recommended start point is to expand / alter Security Districts to match police districts
- Effect boundary changes in Phase III.



# Recommended Security / Civil Alignments


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- Align terrain / boundaries with leaders that have the responsibility and authority within those districts



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## IP Districts – SD Mismatches




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
## Beladiyahs – SD Mismatches



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MND-B AO - BOC AO with SD



SECRET REL USM MCRN/272727



## Scratch Ei

Scratch Ei

SECRET//REL USA MCF1200170245





# Baghdad City Command and Control

**Problem:** Command and Control relationship between Coalition Forces (CF) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) within the Baghdad Operational Command (BOC) challenges synchronized effort within Baghdad City.

## **Discussion:**

- 1 March 2007 – C2 between ISF & CF within the BOC AO changes from all ISF units TACON to MND-B to all ISF units attached to the BOC.
- Result = greater friction conducting joint operations
- Iraqi C2 propensity for direct orders from the top on short notice
- Extensive coordination requirements between operational (Corps) and tactical (MND-B) levels with the BOC
- Fratricide avoidance begs for less flexible C2 while Iraqis and aggressive COIN demands increasing flexibility

## **Way Ahead:**

- Confront issue of who owns “battle space” rather than who own units.
- Continue to focus on partnership relations between CF and ISF
- Increase size of LNO / plans package with the BOC to better integrate CF – ISF operations in Baghdad City.
- Expand partnership between BOC Cdr and the MND-B Cdr
- Maintain relations between the Karkh and Rusafa Commands and MND-B – increasingly exercised through the DCG(M).



# Definitions

**Coordination:** The action necessary to ensure adequately integrated relationships between separate organizations located in the same area. Coordination may include such matters as fire support, emergency defense measures, area intelligence, and other situations in which coordination is considered necessary (FM 6-0)

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15 February 2007

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
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08 - 28 FEB 2007




15 February 2007

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Baghdad Security District Command and Control  
BOC Assumes TACON

as of BOC FOC @ 01 March 2007



15 February 2007

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,  
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff  
Declassified on: 201505

~~SECRET//REL USA, MCFU/20130245-12~~



# Arba'een Security

**Problem:** How to incorporate lessons learned from Ashura security operations, and adjust MND-B Campaign Plan IOT increase support to the GOI for the Arba'een observance.

## Discussion:

- During Ashura - MND-B narrowly averted a major attack against Ashura worshippers and clerics in Najaf
- Rapid deployment of a Stryker Bn (-) to Karbala area in response to the PJCC attack one week earlier provided a capable force properly positioned for rapid response to the Shia extremists in Najaf
- Because of unit diversions to MNF-W, the MND-B Arba'een plan does not include a similar robust reaction force IVO the Karbala or Najaf provinces
- Ashura - Arba'een is not a distinct DP in the Operation Together Forward / Law and Order Campaign Plan for CF
- The ISF will redirect several battalions of combat power from the BSP during Arba'een to protect Pilgrims in the south during the observance - as well as the Kadhimiya Shrine, thereby reducing clear and control forces capability in several SDs

## Way Ahead:

- Forego any major clearing operations in the MND-B AO for the first two weeks in March, as Iraqis re-direct assets to the south
- Focus on disruption tasks in an economy of force effort throughout the AO
- Deploy one Stryker Bn into 4/25 ABN battle space IOT increase security support to the GOI, and MND-B rapid interdiction / response capabilities in the southern provinces during Arba'een


15 February 2007

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# ARBA'EEN TIMELINE



CF Diverted from BSP for Karbala /Ashura

2  
3 (-)

ISF Diverted from BSP for Ashura

8	2	2	2
NP	NP	NP	NP
1	5	6	2
NP	NP	NP	NP
4/1	8/2	7	2
1	1		
NP	NP		
3/1			





**Arbae'en Support**  
28 FEB - 13 MAR

1. Op Burma (Arbaeen) Ph. IV  
disruption targets
  - a. Op Tundra Sweep\* re-attack
  - b. Op Permafrost re-attack
  - c. Hak (ivo Jabella)
  - d. E. Muella
2. Chaka III
3. Upper Buhayrat
4. Hussiniyah Mosque Set IVO Iskan
5. Karbala Target Set
6. ERW sites

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